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Abstract
Cost-effective air pollution emission control has been in focus for decades in international air pollution regulations. Despite 
large observed emission reductions for many air pollutants, environmental and human health problems persist and more 
efforts are needed. However, some stakeholders are concerned that the costs for remaining emission control measures are 
prohibitively high. There are several reasons for concern, and one can be the difference in investment perspectives—i.e. 
costs of borrowing and time constraints—held by stakeholders. By using the integrated assessment model GAINS, we study 
whether differences in investment perspectives of Nordic stakeholders influence measures selected for cost-effective emission 
control and can motivate concerns for high costs of emission control. We distinguish the control cost calculations between 
a social planner perspective and a corporate perspective and apply these to the GAINS model database on emission control 
measures. A cost-minimized selection of measures in 2030 is then calculated for increasing environmental and health ambi-
tions for both perspectives. The results show an irregular pattern, but for a range of ambition levels the corporate perspective 
affects the selection of measures and implies surplus costs for the Nordic social planner of up to 120 million € per year. This 
is 36% more expensive than the costs of the social planners’ selection. Conversely, from a corporate perspective the social 
planners’ selection can imply cost increases of up to 180 million €. We therefore suggest that control of investment perspec-
tive effects should be standard in analysis of cost-effective air pollution measures.
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Introduction
Cost-effectiveness of pollution control is an important 
criteria when setting policy ambition levels in the Goth-
enburg Protocol of the Air Convention (United Nations 
2013) and the EU National Emission Ceilings (NEC) 
Directive (Official Journal of the European Union 2016), 
both controlling European emissions of sulphur dioxide 
 (SO2), nitrogen oxides  (NOx), ammonia  (NH3), fine par-
ticular matter  (PM2.5), and non-methane volatile organic 
compounds (NMVOCs). Given the site-specific nature of 
air pollution dispersion, damages, and emission control, 
the international policy and research community use inte-
grated assessment models (IAMs) such as the Greenhouse 
Gas—Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) 
model (Amann et al. 2011) to analyse cost-effectiveness 
of different policy options. Since cost-effectiveness has 
been a guiding principle of both the Air Convention and 
EU air pollution policies for decades, the conventional 
(end-of-pipe) measures that are considered still available 
for implementation are in general more expensive than 
already implemented measures. If costs are perceived 
as too high, this can lower the ambition level reached in 
future international agreements, and one of the reasons to 
why costs can be perceived as too high is that stakeholders 
and decision-makers have different perspectives on emis-
sion control costs.
Two common perspectives used when calculating and 
comparing emission control costs are the social planner 
perspective and the corporate (private sector) perspective. 
Although likely based on the similar cost calculation prin-
ciples (Graham and Harvey 2001), the two perspectives 
differ with respect to risk and time constraints, as well 
as costs of acquiring financial resources for investments 
(Grout 2003). In integrated assessment modelling, these 
differences mainly imply that different interest rates and 
time constraints are used in calculations. Although no 
strict definition of the social planner seems to exist, in our 
paper the social planner tries to achieve the largest benefit 
for society by reducing emissions where the largest impact 
on the environment and human health can be achieved at 
the lowest costs, with cheap access to capital (low interest 
rates) and long-term time constraints.
The social planner perspective on investments is com-
mon in analysis of emission control costs. This custom 
enables an analysis to: allow for equal comparison of 
costs between countries and sectors; consider the fact 
that governments with cheap access to financial resources 
have control over policy instruments; and avoid financial 
transactions to be included as costs in calculations of 
emission control costs. In contrast, actual decisions on 
which measures to invest in are to an increasing extent 
made by corporations operating under profit-maximizing 
conditions (with high interest rates) and with short-term 
time constraints, which implies a different perspective on 
investments.
Correspondingly, the emission control costs of a control 
measure as perceived from the corporate perspective might 
differ substantially from the costs perceived from the social 
planner perspective. Conceptually, the corporate perspec-
tive implies that from a set of measures, those characterized 
by low investment costs and high costs for operation and 
maintenance are preferred over measures characterized by 
high investment costs and low costs for operation and main-
tenance. This is due to the high interest rate and desired 
short payback time on investments. For the social planner 
perspective, the opposite is true. Corporations might there-
fore perceive the social planners’ cost-effective selection of 
measures as expensive, only because of the different per-
spectives. It is, however, not evident that this conceptual dif-
ference will materialize in an environmental policy context.
The environmental and social impact of the differences 
between investment perspectives of a social planner and 
other decision-makers is sparsely studied, while some (if 
not many) impact analyses are using only one perspective 
without presenting any sensitivity analysis: McCollum 
et al. (2013), van Vuuren et al. (2007), West et al. (2013) 
and Zhang et al. (2018) are examples of this. Goeschl and 
Swanson (2002) found that private firms will underestimate 
the social value of biodiversity available for research and 
development due to differences in perspectives on invest-
ments. Similar but more generic results were also found in 
Delbono and Denicolo (1991). Results from the few studies 
analysing how interest rates might affect investment choices 
and policy recommendations are mixed. van Harmelen et al. 
(2002) controlled for the impacts of interest rates and found 
that ‘The choice of the interest rate of 4% has only a minor 
influence on the technology mix’, and Markandya et al. 
(2018) noticed that a discount rate variation of 0–6% had 
little impact on results. Stocks (1984), however, showed how 
the cost-optimal choice of energy technologies in an Austral-
ian energy system would differ substantially depending on 
the discount rate used in the cost calculations, with similar 
results shown for British utilities in Dimson (1989). Further, 
de Vries et al. (2007) showed how global future estimated 
potential of wind power and solar photo voltaic is affected 
by interest rates. Höglund-Isaksson (2012) presented global 
control cost curves for control of methane  (CH4) and explic-
itly separated the social planner investment perspective from 
the private sector perspective. As expected, Höglund-Isaks-
son (2012) showed (inter alia) that social planner costs are 
lower than private sector costs. More interesting though, 
when reviewing the results from Höglund-Isaksson (2012) 
it is also clear that the control measures considered cost-
effective differ between perspectives. Seventeen out of 30 
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measures change their cost-effectiveness ranking depending 
on investment perspective. This could imply that for any 
given  CH4 target, the measures advocated as suitable for 
cost-effective policy would differ. It also implies that soci-
ety might end up paying more than necessary for emission 
reductions (i.e. facing surplus costs for emission control). 
These implications are also imaginable for multi-pollution 
policies such as air pollution policy. And it is, for the air 
pollutants discussed in this paper, possible that investment 
perspectives might affect both where cost-effective emission 
reductions take place and which pollutants that are reduced.
Therefore, in this paper, we study with the GAINS model 
to what extent differences between social planner and corpo-
rate investment perspectives affect the modelled total costs 
for society of reducing emissions. We also study potential 
impacts of perspectives on control costs per country and 
sector, the cost-optimal combination of measures, as well 
as pollutants controlled.
Which numerical value of the interest rate that represents 
the respective perspectives is subject to a long academic 
debate (Baumol 1968; Grout 2003; Jensen and Bailey 1972; 
Moore et al. 2013; Moore et al. 2004; Spackman 2004). 
Formally in the analysis presented in this paper, the social 
planner perspective implies a 4% interest rate on investment 
(Godard 2009), which is close to other common literature 
values of 3.5% (Moore et al. 2004) and corresponds to the 
value chosen in contemporary air pollution policy analysis 
(Amann 2015). The time constraints of the social planner 
imply that the entire technical lifetime of control measures 
is considered. The corporate perspective implies a 10% inter-
est rate (Boardman et al. 2001) and an economic lifetime 
of control measures of up to 10 years (Höglund-Isaksson 
2012), reflecting higher costs for capital and lower ability 
to accommodate risks.
We choose to delimit our study to the NEC Directives’ 
policy target year 2030 and the countries Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden (together called Nordic in this paper), 
most of which are still in 2030 projected to have problems 
with acidification in addition to problems with human health 
due to air pollution (Fölster et al. 2014; Norwegian Envi-
ronment Agency 2018; Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency 2015). We also limit the analysis by including only 
conventional and well-defined (mainly end-of-pipe) meas-
ures for air pollution control. These types of measures are 
important in the air quality policy agenda, and the knowl-
edge about them is sufficient for IAM of cost-effective air 
pollution control. Other types of measures such as structural 
and behavioural measures are, although important for future 
air quality, not included in this analysis due to lack of sys-
tematic Nordic-wide knowledge of their costs, effects, future 
potential, and applicability. Furthermore, the Nordic coun-
tries have since many years invested in emission control, and 
the remaining end-of-pipe control measures are therefore 
relatively few. Consequently, there is less potential impact 
of investment perspectives on cost-optimal measures and 
surplus costs than if emissions would have been uncontrolled 
and all measures would be available for implementation.
Method and data
With the GAINS model, we calculate scenarios of cost-
effective use of emission control measures for different 
policy ambition levels in 2030, ranging between a Current 
Policy ambition level and 100% policy ambition level. The 
calculations are done either with the investment perspective 
of a social planner (4% interest rate and technical lifetime of 
investment) or corporations (10% interest rate and 10-year 
lifetime). For each ambition level, we compare the perspec-
tives mainly with respect to control costs. The comparison 
identifies potential social planner surplus costs of the cor-
porate perspective and corporate cost increase in the social 
planner perspective. We also compare the cost-optimal com-
bination of measures (strategies) and emission levels.
Scenario description
As a basis for all scenarios in this paper, we use an exog-
enous scenario on emission-driving activities (such as fuel 
use, transportation, and industrial and agricultural produc-
tion) with input from Amann (2015) for Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden, and from Amann et al. (2013) for Norway. 
Most noticeable in this exogenous scenario is that nuclear 
power is increasing, fuel use for light duty road transport is 
decreasing, production in oil refineries is decreasing, and 
livestock is increasing (Fig. 1).
For the scenarios in this paper, we use the GAINS model 
database information to calculate air pollution emissions 
and control costs, specific for each policy ambition level 
and investment perspective. For the Current Policy ambition 
level, the use of emission control measures and the emis-
sions of air pollutants in the Nordic countries are preset and 
identical in the social planner and corporate perspectives. 
The Current Policy ambition level is constructed based on 
current understanding on 2030 impacts from existing poli-
cies to control acidification, eutrophication, and air pollu-
tion-related human health (Amann 2015; Amann et al. 2013; 
Kiesewetter et al. 2015). For the 100% ambition level, all 
technically available control measures would be used in 
2030, implying that the social planner and corporate per-
spectives again lead to identical selection of measures. Cor-
respondingly, the 100% ambition level results in the low-
est technically achievable human health and environmental 
impact due to air pollution out of all ambition levels, given 
the model used.
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We then analyse cost-effective control costs for the ambi-
tion levels in between the Current Policy and the 100% ambi-
tion levels in 5% increments. The percentage value refers to 
the improvement of human health and environmental integrity 
achieved by the ambition level relative to the improvement 
reached in the 100% ambition level. These calculations are 
done separately for the social planner and corporate perspec-
tives. For each analysed ambition level, the cost-effective use 
of available control measures is thereby differentiated between 
a social planner strategy and a corporate strategy.
Calculation of emissions, ambient concentrations, 
and control costs
The GAINS model databases contain information on emission 
factors, emission control measures and their costs, geographi-
cal emission dispersion patterns, as well as on human health 
and environmental sensitivity to air pollution. The calculation 
of emissions is done with the following equation:
(1)Ei =
∑
j,k,m
Ei,j,k,m =
∑
j,k,m
Ai,j,k ⋅ efi,j,k ⋅
(
1 − effm
)
⋅ xi,j,k,m
where i, j, k, m = country or sea region, sector, activity type, 
control measure; Ei = emissions in country i [ktonne]; A = 
activity in a given sector [PJ fuel or other units correspond-
ing to the activity driving emissions]; ef = emission factor 
when not using any control measure [ktonne/unit of emis-
sion-driving activity]; eff = emission reduction efficiency of 
measure m [%]; x = implementation rate of the considered 
control measure m, and of the residual no-control option [%].
After having calculated emissions from a country, con-
centration and deposition of pollutants in receptor regions 
are calculated in the optimization by linear form emission 
dispersion patterns between countries (Eq. 2 shows an 
example for calculation of  PM2.5 concentration):
where r = receptor region;  PMr = concentration of  PM2.5 in 
receptor region r [µg/m3]; pmi = emissions of primary  PM2.5 
in country i [ktonne]; si = emissions of  SO2 in country i 
(2)
PMr =
∑
i
pm
i
⋅ P
i,r +
∑
i
s
i
⋅ S
i,r +
∑
i
a
i
⋅ A
i,r
+
∑
i
n
i
⋅ N
i,r +
∑
i
v
i
⋅ V
i,r + k0,r
(a) Fuel use* in staonary sources (b) Fuel used for transport
(c) Industrial producon from key sectors (d) Number of animals in the agricultural sector
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
PJ
Other renewable
Oil
Coal & Coke
Hydro
Gas
Biomass & Waste
Nuclear 0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
PJ
 fu
el
 u
se
Railways
Domesc shipping
NRMM
Domesc aviaon
Heavy duty road trp.
Light duty road trp.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
M
to
nn
e 
pr
od
uc
o
n
Cement
Paper & Pulp
Metal producon
Refineries
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
m
ill
io
n 
he
ad
s Dairy cale
Other cale
Sheep and goats
Pigs
Poultry
Fig. 1  Aggregated extract of the most pertinent exogenous sce-
nario data for the four Nordic countries for the years 2010–2030. a 
Electricity and heat generation: primary fuel use in combustion and 
nuclear power, and (*) electricity generation from hydro; b primary 
fuel used in transport (NRMM non-road mobile machinery; c indus-
trial production of cement, paper and pulp, metals, and refined oil 
products (other production excluded from the graph in the interest of 
brevity); d number of animals held for meat and milk production
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[ktonne]; ai = emissions of  NH3 in country i [ktonne]; ni = 
emissions of  NOx in country i [ktonne]; vi = emissions of 
NMVOC in country i [ktonne]; k0,r = background concen-
tration constant in region r [µg/m3]; P, S, A, N, V = transfer 
coefficients between source region i and receptor region r 
[µg/m3/ktonne], for the different pollutants PM,  SO2,  NH3, 
 NOx, NMVOC.
Impacts on human health, acidification, and eutrophica-
tion (of which improvements are the objective of the policy 
ambition) are then calculated by comparing the calculated 
concentration and deposition of air pollutants in the receptor 
regions with database information on ecosystem sensitivities 
and population densities. For a detailed description of the 
impact calculations, see Kiesewetter et al. (2015). For the 
purpose of the control cost optimization, region-to-grid coef-
ficients including a downscaling of contributions from low-
level primary  PM2.5 emissions as described by Kiesewetter 
et al. (2015) are aggregated to region-to-region coefficients.
For each of the 5–95% ambition levels, we calculate cost-
effective emission control strategies through linear cost min-
imization. The optimization takes into account (inter alia): 
the measures already used in the Current Policy ambition 
level; that some measures affect emissions of several pol-
lutants; atmospheric interactions of air pollutants; as well as 
differences in environmental sensitivity and population sizes 
between receptor regions (Wagner et al. 2013).
Of specific relevance for this paper is how emission con-
trol costs are calculated. For each measure (m) available to 
reduce emissions from one unit of emission-causing activity 
type (k), annual unit control costs are calculated as:
where  UCan = annual unit control cost [Million €2005/year]; 
 UCO&M = annual unit costs for operation and maintenance of 
the measure [Million €2005/year]; I = investment expenditure 
on the measure [Million €2005]; q = interest rate on invest-
ment [%] (social planner q = 4%; corporate q = 10%); lt = 
economic lifetime of measure [years] (social planner lt = 
technical; Corp lt = <10 years),
The second term in Eq. 3 corresponds to annualized 
investments.
The total annual cost (C) for each measure is then given 
for each country (i) by multiplying the activity level of the 
relevant polluting activity with  UCan and the implementa-
tion rate x in Eq. 1 of the measure. The principle of the 
optimization is then to minimize total annual cost for air pol-
lution control by varying x. The most important constraints 
to the optimization are technical feasibility as given by the 
100% policy ambition scenario, as well as impacts on human 
health, acidification and eutrophication as derived from the 
(3)UCan = UCO&M + I ⋅
(1 + q)lt ⋅ q
(1 + q)lt − 1
percentage specification of each policy ambition (Eq. 4, 
Amann et al. (2011)):
Analysis of potential surplus costs and cost increases
To analyse whether investment perspectives affect the cost-
optimal combination of measures and thereby control costs, 
we re-use the cost-optimal control solutions from the corpo-
rate strategy but apply the cost setting of the social planner 
perspective to calculate social planner costs of the corporate 
strategy. We use the term ‘surplus costs’ to indicate the dif-
ference between the social planner costs of a corporate strat-
egy and the social planner costs of a social planner strategy. 
For comparison, we also reverse the procedure to find the 
corporate costs from implementing the social planner strat-
egy, with the difference between strategies denominated as 
‘cost increases’.
Sensitivity analysis of control costs
In the sensitivity analysis, we vary operation and mainte-
nance costs as well as annualized investment with ± 10% 
independently. The variation of the annualized investment 
with ± 10% corresponds to q having the value 3% or 5% in 
the social planner perspective and 8% or 12% in the corpo-
rate perspective. This sensitivity analysis thereby checks for 
robustness of modelled selection of control measures with 
respect to cost uncertainties.
Data on measure‑specific emission control costs
The cost calculations are based on data from Amann (2015). 
All the input data used to calculate emissions and emission 
control costs, as well as maximum use of control measures, 
are publicly available online at GAINS Europe1 in the sce-
nario group TSAP_Nat_Consultation_2014. Specific infor-
mation on control measures, costs, and effect on emissions 
are for  NOx taken from Cofala and Syri (1998a), for  SO2 
Cofala and Syri (1998b), for  PM2.5 Klimont et al. (2002) and 
Cofala et al. (2006), and for  NH3 Klimont and Winiwarter 
(2011). Aggregated results on emissions and control costs 
as presented in the source literature are shown in Table 1. 
(4)
∑
i
∑
k
∑
o
Ci,k,o → min
1 Online access to GAINS Europe: http://gains .iiasa .ac.at/gains /
EUN/index .login ?logou t=1&switc h_versi on=v0 . GAINS is openly 
accessible (registration required).
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Results
Our model calculations show that the investment perspec-
tive has an impact on emission control costs for some, but 
not all, policy ambition levels, as is shown in Fig. 2. There 
are two major deviations from the costs of the social plan-
ner strategy if Nordic emission reductions are achieved 
with the corporate strategy. At 35% ambition level, surplus 
costs for society of the social planner strategy are 24 mil-
lion €2005 per year and the corporate strategy is 62% more 
expensive. At 85% ambition level, a social planner strategy 
costs 331 million €2005 per year and the corporate strategy 
is 36% more expensive. In between these two deviations, 
the costs are fairly similar, so some modelled policy ambi-
tion levels appear relatively robust with respect to invest-
ment strategies for the social planner.
Conversely, the social planner strategy would lead to 
corporate cost increases when costs are recalculated using 
the corporate perspective. But as Fig. 3 shows, the cost 
increases from the optimal corporate strategy of a social 
planner strategy would be relatively evenly distributed for all 
of the more ambitious policy ambition levels. Meaning most 
of the modelled ambitious social planner strategies appears 
to be unnecessarily expensive from a corporate perspective.
The differences in control costs are caused by different 
cost-effective combinations of measures in the respective 
strategies. Here, we present these differences for the strate-
gies used to reach an 85% policy ambition level. The result 
from the sensitivity analysis on cost-optimal control meas-
ures is presented within brackets in the text and tables and 
as error bars in Fig. 4.
For the 85% ambition, the surplus costs from using a cor-
porate strategy are unevenly distributed over the countries. 
At this ambition level, the social planner surplus costs would 
be 105 (99–105), 13 (6–16), and 17 (16–28) million €2005 in 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, respectively, if a corporate 
strategy would be used, but decrease by − 16 (− 15 to − 24) 
Table 1  Nordic emission trend 2010–2030 and emission control costs 
according to current legislation and alternative 2030 emissions and 
control costs in a Maximum Technical Feasible Reduction (MTFR) 
scenario (Amann 2015; Amann et al. 2013). Current legislation cor-
responds to Current Policy ambition in this paper, and MTFR cor-
responds to 100% policy ambition. The costs are calculated with a 
social planner perspective
Year Unit
Current legislation MTFR
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2030
Emissions
NOx 627 534 431 367 334 271 ktonne
SO2 137 117 109 107 105 94 ktonne
NH3 177 169 164 167 167 123 ktonne
NMVOC 505 436 374 358 337 293 ktonne
PM2.5 138 126 114 112 107 80 ktonne
Costs 3932 4597 5089 5411 5581 6897 million €2005/yr
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Fig. 2  Social planner control costs in 2030 of increasing air pollution 
policy ambition levels (increasing from 5 to 95%) if using a social 
planner strategy or a corporate strategy. In the figure, it can be seen 
that the social planner surplus costs of the corporate strategy are 
irregular and highest at the 85% policy ambition level
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Fig. 3  Corporate perspective control costs in 2030 of increasing air 
pollution policy ambition levels (increasing from 5 to 95%) if using 
a social planner strategy or a corporate strategy. The corporate cost 
increase in the social planner strategy is irregular over ambition levels 
but more evenly spread out than in Fig. 2
Investment perspectives on costs for air pollution control affect the optimal use of emission…
1 3
million €2005 in Finland. For the entire region, social planner 
surplus costs would be 119 (98–134) million €2005. There are 
also differences in which sector the cost differences occur 
(Fig. 4).
When comparing cost-effective measures, it can be seen 
that in the model calculations of the 85% ambition level the 
most significant impact of investment perspectives is found 
with the corporate strategy’s increased use of cleaner stoves 
and fireplaces in the Danish residential sector, which reduce 
emissions of  PM2.5 and NMVOC.
But there are also a number of other but smaller differ-
ences between the two strategies. For Finland, the corpo-
rate strategy mainly implies lower use of the same measures 
in residential combustion, which is also the case for Nor-
way, with corresponding increase in  PM2.5 and NMVOC 
emissions. For Norway, also  NOx emissions from industry 
increase, but through reduced focus on combustion modifi-
cation in boilers and other industrial combustion compared 
to the social planner. However, through increased use of 
low sulphur fuels, covering of manure storage as well as 
biofiltration, the corporate strategy leads to lower Norwe-
gian emissions of  SO2 and  NH3, respectively. For Sweden, 
the most significant change with the corporate strategy is a 
reduction of  NOx emissions from cement production, but 
also  NH3 emissions go down slightly through improved and 
combined agricultural practices.
Consequently, the investment perspective has an impact 
on modelled national total levels of emissions at the 85% 
ambition level (Table 2) as well as for several other ambi-
tion levels (supplementary material). For Denmark and the 
85% ambition level, the corporate strategy implies larger 
focus on reduction of  NH3,  PM2.5, and NMVOC, while for 
Finland the situation is reversed. Finland is also reducing 
less  NOx emissions with the corporate strategy than with the 
social planner strategy. The corporate strategy also implies 
that Norway reduces more emissions of  SO2 and  NH3 than 
with the social planner strategy, while Sweden reduces more 
emissions of  NOx and  NH3. For the entire region, the social 
planner strategy implies focus on control of  NOx,  PM2.5, and 
NMVOC, whereas the corporate strategy puts more focus 
on  SO2 and  NH3.
Discussion
Our results show that the investment perspective chosen 
for control cost calculation with the GAINS model has 
an impact—although irregular—on total control costs, 
the combination of measures considered cost-effective, in 
which country and sector emission reductions take place, 
and which pollutants are reduced. More specifically, if 
considering surplus costs of at least 20% as a lower bound-
ary for significant differences between strategies, there are 
9 out of 19 analysed policy ambition levels where invest-
ment perspectives have an impact on costs and control 
measures. The lowest modelled ambition level with sig-
nificant surplus costs is 25% and the highest 85%, with 
non-significant differences in the 50–70% range. For the 
entire Nordic region, the corporate strategy to reach 85% 
ambition level implies larger efforts to control  NOx,  PM2.5, 
and NMVOC emissions, but there are variations between 
countries. At 85% ambition level, the main impact of the 
Fig. 4  Social planner control 
cost changes at an 85% policy 
ambition level if using the 
corporate strategy instead of the 
social planner strategy. Costs 
are presented per country and 
sector. The whiskers present 
the variation as given by the 
technology selections in the 
sensitivity analysis. Most 
importantly, the corporate 
strategy implies higher efforts to 
control emissions from Danish 
residential combustion, Norwe-
gian industrial processes, and 
Swedish agricultural activities 
than the social planner strategy 
but less efforts for Finnish 
residential combustion. Also 
interesting is that for the 85% 
ambition level, no real differ-
ences between strategies are 
found for the emitting sectors: 
solvent use; fuel production; 
and waste
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corporate strategy is that it implies larger focus on control-
ling  PM2.5 emissions from Danish residential combustion 
and Swedish  NH3 emissions from agriculture, and smaller 
focus on reducing  PM2.5 emissions from residential com-
bustion in Finland.
The irregularity of surplus costs over ambition levels 
is not surprising given the expected limitation in available 
measures in the Nordic countries by 2030. In the Current 
Policy ambition level—which is the starting point of our 
analysis—only an average of ~ 30% of all measures in the 
model database is available as a response to increased pol-
icy ambition. If the number of available measures had been 
larger, i.e. with a less ambitious Current Policy situation, it 
is likely that the impact of investment perspectives would 
be larger and also more regular. Our results match well with 
the findings of Höglund-Isaksson (2012), and they also give 
a potential explanation for why other studies have shown 
contradicting results. Bearing in mind the irregularity of our 
results over ambition levels, it is perfectly possible that the 
non-impact of changing interest rates in van Harmelen et al. 
(2002) and Markandya et al. (2018) is consistent with the 
large impact of varying discount rates presented in Stocks 
(1984), Dimson (1989), and de Vries et al. (2007).
One limitation of the analytical approach in this paper 
is that mainly end-of-pipe emission control measures are 
included in the analysis. However, to focus on this type of 
measures is consistent with the current focus on best avail-
able emission control technologies in existing European air 
pollution policies (EC JRC 2016; UNECE 2015, 2016), and 
the existing European policy distinction between climate and 
air pollution challenges. This distinction is, however, known 
to reduce cost-effectiveness of policies (Zusman et al. 2013) 
and also limits the policy push for using climate measures 
to help reach air pollution objectives and vice versa. The 
focus on end-of-pipe also ensures the estimate of surplus 
costs to be on the cautious side. As is discussed above, more 
available measures will decrease the irregularity and likely 
increase relative surplus costs of corporate strategies. Fur-
thermore, we only compare two investment perspectives 
which are separated only through two parameters (interest 
rate and time constraints). If we included the investment 
perspective of individuals/households (typically facing even 
higher interest rates and more short-sighted), the impact 
should be larger. The impact of our two-parameter descrip-
tion of perspectives is unclear, but given that the GAINS 
model method for calculating costs appears to be similar 
to the methods used by corporations (Graham and Harvey 
2001), we think that a more complex description should give 
similar results. Finally, the presented numerical impact on 
costs, measures, and emissions is specific to the expected 
situation in the Nordic countries 2030; therefore, the pos-
sibility of a quantitative generalization is limited.
Table 2  National total 2030 
emissions per country and per 
investment strategy for the 85% 
ambition level (ktonne). The 
strategy leading to the largest 
emission reductions marked 
with bold for each pollutant 
and country. Results from the 
sensitivity analysis within 
brackets
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Nordic total
SO2
Soc. 7.9
(7.9–7.9)
41.0
(41.0–41.0)
18.0
(18.0–18.0)
30.0
(29.9–30.3)
96.9
(96.8–97.2)
Corp. 7.9
(7.9–7.9)
40.1
(40.1–41.0)
17.0
(16.9–17.2)
29.9
(29.9–29.9)
94.9
(94.8–96.0)
NOx
Soc. 56.0
(55.9–56.0)
92.6
(91.8–92.6)
113.2
(113.2–113.8)
66.4
(66.4–66.4)
328.2
(327.3–328.8)
Corp. 55.9
(55.9–55.9)
93.6
(92.9–93.6)
118.6
(118.6–118.7)
65.2
(65.2–65.2)
333.3
(332.6–333.4)
NH3
Soc. 42.8
(42.8–43.1)
28.3
(28.3–28.3)
18.2
(18.2–18.2)
37.3
(37.3–37.3)
126.6
(126.6–126.9)
Corp. 42.6
(42.6–42.7)
28.4
(28.4–28.4)
17.9
(17.9–17.9)
36.4
(36.1–36.4)
125.3
(125.0–125.4)
PM2.5
Soc. 9.7
(9.6–9.7)
19.1
(19.1–19.1)
36.0
(36.0–36.0)
17.3
(17.3–17.3)
82.1
(82.0–82.1)
Corp. 8.9
(8.9–8.9)
20.4
(20.3–20.5)
36.8
(36.8–36.8)
17.3
(17.3–17.3)
83.4
(83.3–83.5)
NMVOC
Soc. 51.4
(51.4–51.4)
52.6
(52.6–52.6)
93.6
(93.6–93.6)
118.3
(118.3–118.3)
315.9
(315.9–315.9)
Corp. 50.5
(50.3–50.5)
59.4
(59.4–59.6)
90.3
(90.3–94.3)
118.3
(118.3–118.3)
318.5
(318.3–322.7)
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There are several implications of our results. First of all, 
the fact that investment perspectives can affect modelled 
efforts per country and pollutants prioritized is important 
for international air pollution policy since current poli-
cies, such as the NEC directive, specify efforts per coun-
try and pollutant. Second, the results support the suspicion 
that investment perspectives might affect the total costs for 
society of reducing emissions. For several modelled ambi-
tion levels, the measures considered cost-effective by the 
social planner are different from the measures considered 
cost-effective by corporations, despite the large number of 
measures already implemented in the Current Policy ambi-
tion level. Third, there are modelled ambition levels with 
little impact of investment perspectives. These ambition 
levels should have higher chances of emissions being con-
trolled with the measures prescribed by the social planner 
than other ambition levels, regardless of investment perspec-
tive (within reasonable limits). This in turn should increase 
robustness and acceptance by stakeholders of these ambition 
levels. Finally, the results point to the importance of clearly 
expressing which investment perspective (interest rates and 
economical life times) that is used when calculating cost-
effective emission control, and to the importance of making 
sensitivity analysis over these economic parameters prior 
to drawing policy recommendations from cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Since it is more and more common that corpora-
tions make real-life investment decisions, it is beneficial to 
have a corporate perspective present in the analysis of cost-
effective emission control. In conclusion, the main implica-
tion of our results is that sensitivity over interest rates should 
be included in future analysis of cost-effective air pollution 
control.
Our analysis is made in an air pollution policy context, 
but the patterns we identify should be applicable to other 
environmental as well as climate policies. Cases when 
investment perspectives can be important for environmental 
policy instrument design are for example: when designing 
policy instruments to achieve cost-effective pollution con-
trol; when calculating and communicating marginal abate-
ment cost (MAC) curves for pollution control; and when 
analysing desirable pollution tax levels.
Our results also complement ongoing research on policy 
instruments for control of multiple pollutants. Earlier stud-
ies—although focusing mainly on the interplay between 
greenhouse gases and air pollutants—have, for example, 
identified that strategic corporate behaviour in emission 
permit markets might lead to cost inefficiencies (Dickson 
and MacKenzie 2018). It is also identified that the choice 
between an emission tax and permit instruments on different 
pollutants in a multi-pollutant system might have welfare 
impacts, where the key determinant is whether the pollut-
ants are complements or substitutes (Ambec and Coria 2013; 
Fullerton and Karney 2018). Furthermore, also related to our 
results, Ambec and Coria (2018) and Antoniou and Kyriako-
poulou (2015) show how the best choice of instruments is 
affected by the geographical dispersion of emissions and the 
national/international structure of governance. Our results 
add yet another dimension to this ongoing research on cost-
effective multi-pollutant environmental policy by showing 
how also investment perspectives can affect cost-effective-
ness of a policy. The next step for research should be to 
identify which policy instruments that have the potential to 
alleviate the effect of investment perspectives on emission 
control.
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